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Abstract—Congestion game is a widely used model for modern
networked applications. A central issue in such applications is
that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource
overloading and negative externalities for the system participants.
In this work, we propose a pricing mechanism that guarantees
the sub-linear increase of the time-cumulative violation of the
resource load constraints. The feature of our method is that it
is resource-centric in the sense that it depends on the congestion
state of the resources and not on specific characteristics of the
system participants. This feature makes our mechanism scalable,
flexible, and privacy-preserving. Moreover, we show by numerical
simulations that our pricing mechanism has no significant effect
on the agents’ welfare in contrast to the improvement of the
capacity violation.
Index Terms—Congestion Game, Resource Allocation, Decen-
tralized algorithm, Mirror Descent, Pricing Algorithm, Network
Routing
I. INTRODUCTION
Optimizing users/devices competing for utilization of re-
sources (be it network link, power supply, or wireless spec-
trum) have become essential components of modern networked
systems such as IoT, smart grid, and cognitive radio. A trend
in recent years is that the number of users in such applications
increases tremendously (see e.g. [1]). For instance: Analysts
predicts that more than 50 billion things are expected to be
connected over the internet by the end of 2020 [1]. Such
rapid growth involves certainly a series of challenges. One of
the main challenges facing the system managers is congestion
control (CC) of the available resources. For without it, negative
externalities in the form of quality degradation of resource
services might occur due to overload. For instance, in wireless
communication network applications, an excessive amount of
traffic through a base station or an access point (resource)
might result in buffer bloat, and consequently in the ineffi-
ciency of the system in the form of high latency and network
throughput reduction, causing a negative experience for all
users. Furthermore, sophisticated congestion control method
is crucial for making the electrical power driven technologies
environment-friendly, Another trend visible in recent years is
that power consumption due to technical applications consti-
tutes a non-negligible part of the global power consumption
with the tendency of enormous growth (see e.g., [2]).
The excessive numbers of users in modern networked
systems and the decreasing degree of cooperativeness justify
the attractiveness of the famous game theoretical concepts for
system modeling. A natural fundament for developing a CC
method is the concept of the congestion game introduced in
[3], [4]. The corresponding model assumes non-cooperative
rational participants, whose strategy is an allocation policy
over resources, and whose loss depends proportionally on the
total load of the utilized resources.
The most prominent classical example of a congestion
game is the traffic routing model [5], where the arcs in a
given network represent the resources, the different origin-
destination pairs specify the player, and the possible action of
a player is the allocation over the paths in the system. This
concept has also lead to fruitful discussions in the wireless net-
work literature. It has recently been used in wireless network
modeling, e.g., access point selection in WiFi networks [6],
[7], uplink resource allocation in multichannel wireless access
networks [8], wireless channels with multipacket reception
capability [9], and the impact of interference set in studying
the congestion game in wireless mesh networks [10].
Many CC methods are user-centric in the sense that they
require observability of system participants’ actions and be-
haviors and provide specific instructions for all of the system
users. Such practicas are not suitable for modern large-scale
applications. The reason is threefold: First, such methods
often lack scalability and flexibility; Second, the typically
high number of participants in such applications makes the
approaches computationally infeasible; Third, due to growing
users’ demands of sovereignty and privacy in recent years,
direct observation and influence of users’ acts by higher
authority are highly undesirable.
Our Contributions: In this work, we assume that the
agents are rational and cost-oriented, in the sense that they
choose actions minimizing the accumulated historical costs,
and that they are non-cooperative, i.e. they do not mutually
communicate. Based on that, we propose resource-centric
dynamic pricing that offers the system participants appropriate
incentives to adhere to the resource constraints jointly support
sustainable use of the resources. We present our theoretical
guarantee that our proposed method ensures that the average
violation of the capacity constraints decays of order Opn´1{2q
w.r.t. the time-horizon n. Complementary to this result, we
provide numerical simulations for the network routing game
– an instance of the congestion game. As a by-product of
our practical investigation, we observe that, compared to the
gain in resource sustainability, our pricing mechanism does
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
06
08
0v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  1
4 F
eb
 20
20
not significantly effectuate the agents’ welfare (expressed by
their average loss significantly).
Relation to prior work: The congestion game has been
investigated in several directions. Closely related to our work
are the following approaches which consider the game played
repeatedly: Under different model of the individual agents,
[11]–[14] study the convergence of selfish behaviour toward
the Nash equilibrium. Besides the fact that it yields a sub-
optimal welfare of the agents [15], Nash equilibrium of this
sort of game might not be a resource sustainable population
state (see also the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium in
[16], [17]). In order to relieve those undesired effects, several
works introduce exciting approaches. Closely related to ours
are pricing based methods, e.g. [18]–[23]. The common aspect
of the listed works is that they design a population dynamic
which converges to the corresponding (designed) equilibrium
fulfilling the capacity constraints (see e.g., the concept of
generalized Nash equilibrium [16]) of the problem-specific
potential game [24]. A clear contrast to our work is that they
only provide asymptotic guarantee. Moreover, the methods
proposed in some of those works, such as, requires agents’
personalized information such as their utilities.
Basic Notions and Notations: For a real vector a, ras`
denotes the vector whose entries are the non-negative part of
the entries of a. Let pX , }¨}q be a normed space and A,B Ď X .
We denote A ´ B :“ tx´ y : x P A, y P Bu, and }A} :“
supxPA }x}. In this work we assume that a probability space
pΩ,Σ,Pq and a filtration F :“ pFnqnPN0 therein are given.
II. SETTING
Congestion Game: A congestion game consists of a finite
set of agents/players rN s and a finite set R of resources. To
each agent i P rN s, there corresponds a collection Pi Ď 2R
of resource bundles. One may encode the latter assumption
by defining the adjacency matrixMpiq P R|R|ˆ|Pi| whose Pi-
th column provides the information about all the resources
contained in the bundle Pi, i.e.:
rMpiqsr,Pi “
#
1 r P Pi
0 else
.
The aim of each agent i P rN s is to execute a cer-
tain amount mi ą 0 of tasks by utilizing the bundles
of resources from Pi. We describe the corresponding (uti-
lization) action/strategy of agent i by a vector xpiq P
Xi, where Xi is a scaled simplex on Pi, i.e.: Xi :“!
xpiq :“ pxpiqPi qPiPPi P R|Pi| :
ř
PiPPi x
piq
Pi “ mi
)
. For any
Pi P Pi, xpiqPi corresponds to the amount of tasks agent i
allocates to the bundle Pi. Equivalently, we can describe the
task allocation strategy of agent i by means of the simplex
∆i :“
!
µpiq :“ pµpiqPi qPiPPi P R|Pi| :
ř
PiPPi µ
piq
Pi “ 1
)
. In
this paper we describe the allocation strategy of agent i by
means of the simplex ∆i instead of Xi. We denote the set of
population strategy by ∆ “śNi“1 ∆i.
Let µpiq P ∆i be an allocation action of agent i. The
total load φpiqr pµpiqq of the resource r P R caused by the
allocation action µpiq P ∆i of agent i is given by φpiqr pµpiqq “
ř
PiPPi:rPPi miµ
piq
Pi . Accordingly, the total load φrpxq of
resource r caused by the population strategy µ P ∆ is given by
φrpµq “ řNi“1 φpiqr pµpiqq We sometimes also use the notation
φ :“ pφrqrPR. Moreover, we consider in this work the case
where the load of resources r P R is desirable to not exceed
the capacity Lr P Rą0, i.e. φrpµpkqq ´ Lr “: Γrpµq ď 0.
To each resource r P R, we associate a function `r :
Rě0 Ñ R which quantifies negative externalities induced on
the resource r due to load φrpµq. We refer to `r as the loss
function of the resource r. We assume throughout:
Assumption 1: For all r P R, `r : Rě0 Ñ R is continuous,
convex, and non-decreasing.
Assumption 2 (Slater’s Condition): There exists µˆ P ∆ s.t.
Γpµˆq ă 0.
The loss of a bundle Pi P Pi (for agent i) is correspondingly
given by `piqPi pµq “
ř
rPPi `rpφrpµqq. Throughout this work
we use the notations `piq :“ p`piqPi qPiPPi and ` :“ p`piqqiPrNs.
An example of congestion game is the following:
Example 1 (Network Routing Game): Given a directed
Graph G “ pV, Eq with a vertex set V and edge set
E Ď V ˆ V . In a routing game, the task of agent i P rN s is
to transport a certain amount of commodity mi ą 0 from
a starting point spiq P V to a destination tpiq P V . To fulfill
this task, agent i can use a prescribed collection Pi Ď 2E of
edges that connects spiq and tpiq. To every edge (resource)
e P E there corresponds a function ce (loss) that maps the
total amount flow caused by the transport of commodities on
the edge e to a non-negative number determining the delay
on e, and also a constant `e ą 0 which prescribed the amount
of flow admissible on edge e.
Remark 1: The congestion game which we investigate in
this chapter is an instance of the so-called potential games
which are games admitting a potential function: a real-valued
function whose unilateral change describes the change in
the player’s payoffs. Finite player potential game was firstly
studied by Rosenthal [3], who also recognized its relation to
congestion game and systematically investigated by Monderer
and Shapley [24]. The work [24] also provides a generalization
of the finite player setting to infinite player setting, which is
the subject of our investigations.
Remark 2: The infinite player setting can be either seen as
a mixed strategy version of finite player setting, or as an
approximation of the finite player setting with large number of
populations, and is more convenient; since the latter case can
be cumbersome to analyze. However, there is a key difference
between finite and infinite cases: while the Nash equilibria
in finite case are exactly the optimizers of the corresponding
potential function, not all equilibria are optimizers [11] in
the infinite case; although in that case, all optimizers of the
potential function are equilibria.
Performance Measures: Let be k P N and µpτq, τ P rks0,
be a given sequence of population actions from initial time
until time slot k. To evaluate the population performance in
the congestion game we use the following criteria:
We measure the resource sustainability of the population
sequential actions pµpτqqτPrks0 by the (norm) of the aggregated
admissible flow violation defined by:
ACVpkq “
›››››
«
k´1ÿ
τ“0
Γrpµpτqq
ff
`
›››››
2
Additional to resource sustainability behavior, we investi-
gate the loss incurred to the population applying the resource
allocation decisions pµpτqqτPrks0 in form of the aggregated
delay:
ADpkq “
kÿ
τ“0
ÿ
iPrNs
Dipτq,
where Dipτq denotes the delay experienced by agent i at time
τ , i.e. Dipτq “ řPiPPi `piqPi pµpτqqµpiqPi pτq.
It should be noted, that resource sustainability and loss
minimization do not need to be coinciding objectives, but can
display a trade-off behavior depending on model parameters,
i.e. they appear as conflicting objectives. Therefore it can
happen, that resource sustainability subsequently implies a
disadvantaging of some agents.
III. RESOURCE-CENTRIC PRICING FOR CONGESTION
GAME
Population Dynamic via Score and Hedge strategy:
Throughout this work, we consider the congestion game,
which is played multiply with time horizon n P N. We provide
a summary of our model for the agents’ decision-making
process in Algorithm 1.
According to Algorithm 1, every agent i P rN s accumu-
lates at each round k P rns the present and historical cost
(discounted by a given parameter γ) of each resource bundle
available to him, aiming to provide the scores of her bundle
preferences. This model corresponds to non-myopic data-
driven agents that utilize historical data to derive their strategy.
This assumption of agents’ behavior is quite plausible for
recent applications that mostly utilize statistical and learning
methods by accumulating past data (in this context: resource
costs).
The corresponding actual cost of an available bundle con-
sists of the actual noisy loss caused by negative externalities
and the price set exogenously by a regulator (c.f. Algorithm
2). We assume that the noispξnqnPN is a R
řN
i“1|Pi|-valued F-
martingale difference sequence which is a quite general noise
model. One reason that we model the loss as noisy is that the
environment or the imperfectness of agents’ sensing devices
can cause imperfectness of agents’ feedback. Another reason
is that we can handle the case where the agents’ actions are
discrete while their strategies are mixed states, and thus the
resource congestion only represents an unbiased sample of the
congestion specified by the mixed strategies (see [25]).
The mapping Φpiq serves to model how the ith agent builds
up his allocation strategy from the actual score of the bundles.
In this work, we investigate the case where it takes the
following specific form:
pΦpiqpypiqqqPi “
exppypiqPi qřĂPiPPi exppypiqĂPi q . (2)
Algorithm 1 Hedge algorithm with Prices
Require: n P N, γ ą 0, Φi : RPi Ñ ∆i.
for every agent i P rN s do
Initialize the score vector Y piq0 Ð 0
end for
for time k “ 1, 2, . . . , n do
Population apply the allocation strategy:
Xpkq “ pmiµpiqpkqqiPrNs
for every agent i P rN s do
Receive the price vector pΛrpkqqrPR broadcasted by
the regulator.
for all bundle of resource Pi P Pi do
Experience the disturbed cost:
ˆ`piqPi pkq Ð `
piq
Pi pµpkqq ` ξ
piq
Pi pk ` 1q
Compute the price per amount of task:
pi
piq
Pi pkq “
ÿ
rPPi
Λrpkq
Update the score of bundle Pi:
Y
piq
Pi pk ` 1q Ð Y
piq
Pi pkq ´ γ
”
ˆ`piqPi pkq ` pi
piq
Pi pkq
ı
(1)
end for
Generate the allocation strategy (see (2)):
µpiqpk ` 1q Ð ΦpiqpY piqpk ` 1qq
end for
end for
Without altering the analysis given in this work, one can
use more generally the concept of the mirror map (See
also [25]) for specifying the choice map Φpiqpypiqq :“
arg max
µpiqP∆i
 @
µpiq, ypiq
D´ ψipµpiqq(, where ψpiq : ∆i Ñ R
strongly convex w.r.t. } ¨ }1. For instance, one can use the
usual Euclidean projection onto the simplex instead.
Remark 3: Without altering the analysis given in this work,
one can use more generally the concept of mirror map (See
also [25]) for specifying the choice map Φi. Specifically Φi
which takes the form
Φpiqpypiqq :“ arg max
µpiqP∆i
!A
µpiq, ypiq
E
´ ψipµpiqq
)
,
for a function ψpiq : ∆i Ñ R strongly convex w.r.t. } ¨ }1. For
instance the usual Euclidean projection onto the simplex can
be used as the choice map.
Pricing Algorithm: To encourage sustainable use of the
resources, we specify the price vector required by Algorithm
1 via the mechanism described in Algorithm 2. We underline
the fundamental role of the price to reflect the scarcity of
a resource by setting the price update (3) proportional to
the present congestion state φr,k ´ Lr (with the parameter
β specifying the sensitivity of the prices to the congestion
state). This aspect allows the regulators to indicate a possible
resource overload implicitly.
Algorithm 2 Resource-Centric Pricing
Require: n P N, β ą 0, α P p0, 1s
Initialize the price vector Λ0 Ð 0
for time k “ 1, 2, . . . , n do
for r P R do
Check the actual load φr,k :“ φrpXpkqq of ressource
r caused by Algorithm 1
Update the price of resource r:
Λrpk ` 1q Ð rp1´ αqΛrpkq ` β pφr,k ´ Lrqs` (3)
end for
end for
Furthermore, we introduce ”memory” into the price dy-
namics by involving the previous price update Λrpkq into
(3). The reason is twofold; firstly, to ensure the alignment
of the incentives with the non-myopic behavior of the agents,
and secondly to track the congestion dynamic for analytical
purposes. The latter reason becomes clear by iterating (3) (with
α “ 0), and recognizing, that the prices give an upper bound
for the ACV. However, a possible drawback of this procedure
is that a sharp price increase might result in a domination of
the agents’ preferences (expressed by their losses): It follows
from (1) that unusually high prices caused the agents to decide
for the resources, having the lowest prices and not for the ones
giving them the lowest loss – resulting in a degradation of the
population’s welfare. Thus, we introduce in Algorithm 2 the
parameter α whose role is to bypass the phenomenon above
by offsetting the memory in the price dynamic.
update score(.)
update strategy(.)
agent(1)
...
agent(N)
Y (k + 1)
µ(k + 1)
X(k)
Agents: [N ]
update load(.)
update delay(.)
get cost(.)
Σ
φr(µ(k))
`r(φr(k))
ˆ`(µ(k))
φr(µ(k))
ˆ`(k) + pi(k)
Network
set price(.)
get price(.)
Resource: r ∈ R
Λr(k + 1)
Λr(k)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
Fig. 1. Sketch of Algorithms 1 and 2. The blue color marks the agents’
affairs, the red price the setters’ (resources), and the black the networks’
Relation between Algorithms 1 and 2: In order to clarify
the relationship between the price setters, i.e., resources, we
sketch the connection between Algorithms 1 and 2 in Figure
1. It is apparent that the resource-prices are decided parallelly
in-situ and do not require any centralized instance in contrast
to most of the resource control mechanisms such as the
bidding-based and auction-based mechanism. This aspect is
an advantage since centralized solutions are known to be
sensitive to malicious attacks and require rather sophisticated
computations, e.g., solving an optimization problem. Also, we
want to stress that the price of a resource r is based purely on
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Fig. 2. Performance for Lr “ 14
the congestion state φr,k ´ Lr and not on the (preferences of
the) agents utilizing the resource r P R.Since the agents do
not have to reveal their strategy and preferences (e.g., resource
bundles), our method respects the sovereignty and the privacy
of the individuals. Moreover, since our method does not cling
to a specific agent’s feedback, agents can be added or removed,
making this approach particularly flexible.
By not knowing the preferences of the agents and due to the
absence of a centralized instance, we may sacrifice some de-
sired properties of the mechanism (e.g., driving the population
toward a socially optimum state and budget balance). However,
in order to approach the fulfillment of the first property, tuning
the parameters of the mechanism and accepting looser resource
constraints so that the prices do not dominate the loss of the
agents, results in resource sustainability with a lower cost of
welfare degradation (for details see Section V).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Throughout, C1, C2, C3,m˚ denote non-negative constants
fulfilling for all µ P ∆ and λ P RRě0:
Nÿ
i“1
mi}Mpiq,Tλ}28 ď C21}λ}22,
Nÿ
i“1
mi}`piqpµq}28 ď C22
}φpµq ´ L}2 ď C3, mi ď m˚, @i P rN s.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1: Let γ ą 0 be given, β “ γ, and α “ δγ2 with
δ ą 0 satisfying
pC21 ` γ2δ2q ´ δ2 ď 0. (4)
It holds:
E
” }Λpnq´λ˚}22
2
ı
ď∆ψ22 ` p1` αnq }λ˚}
2
2
2 ` C˜
2
1
2 γ
2n
` 2γ2m˚N
nÿ
k“1
Er}ξk}28s
(5)
where rC21 :“ 2 `C22 ` 2C23˘ and ∆ψ2 “ 2m˚řNi“1 lnp|Pi|q
Remark 4: A necessary condition for gamma such that there
exists a δ ą 0 satisfying (4) is:
γ ď 1
4C1
. (6)
If this is fulfilled, then (4) is equivalent to:
1´a1´ 16γ2C21
4γ2
ď δ ď 1`
a
1´ 16γ2C21
4γ2
. (7)
We also observe that for small enough γ, we can choose
δ « 2C1, which does not depend on the horizon length.
Attentive reader may recognize by inspecting the proof of
above Theorem that in order that above result holds, it is not
necessary, that α is of the form α “ δγ2, and thus that the
regulator knows precisely about the agents’ step size. The only
requirement is that α has to decay slower than γ2 with the
time horizon T . However, one obtains the best rate for the
performance guarantee in case that α is of order γ2 (w.r.t. T ).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is the following
(for proof see the full version [26]) guarantee for the accumu-
lation of the capacity violation:
Corollary 2: Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 1 are
fulfilled and that the noise is persistent in the sense that there
exists σ2 ą 0 s.t. Er}ξk}28s ď σ
2
4m˚N for all k P N. It holds:
E r}Λpnq}2s ď∆ψ ` p1`
ap1` δγ2nqq}λ˚}2
` pC˜1 ` σqγ?n,
(8)
where ∆ψ and C˜1 is given as in Theorem 1. Now, suppose
that γ :“ c{?n: for a constant c ą 0 and δ P p0, 1{γ2q s.t.
(4) is fulfilled. It holds:
E rACVpnqs ď pδc` 1c qA
?
n, (9)
where A :“ ∆ψ ` p1`ap1` δc2qq}λ˚}2 ` pC˜1 ` σqc.
V. SIMULATION
Game Setting: We consider the network routing problem
given in Example 1 which we specify as follows: V consists of
15 nodes and E is built from a randomly generated adjacency
matrix (without self-loop) with independent entries, where
each non-diagonal is 1 with probability 0.5. Furthermore, we
consider N “ 10 agents, each has the starting point and the
destination randomly uniformly chosen from V . Given the lat-
ter, each agent i has randomly created bundles of maximal size
|Pi| ď 10. We set the total resource load mi “ 20, @i P rN s,
and the admissible flow per resource Lr “ 14, @r P R. For the
cost per resource `r,k, we consider a quadratic polynomial of
the form `r,kpφrpkqq “ aprq2 φrpkq2 ` aprq1 φrpkq ` aprq0 , where
the coefficients paprq2 , aprq1 , aprq0 q for each resource r P R are
independently randomly uniformly chosen from r0, 0.05s.
Parameter Setting: We set the parameters required by
Algorithms 1 and 2 as follows: We consider the time horizon
n “ 103, the agents’ learning rate γ “ 0.1?n “ 0.0032, and
the response parameter α “ 10´5. We are not only interested
in the case β “ γ analyzed in Section IV, but also in the case
where the regulator is uncertain about the agents’ learning
rate, and therefore β differs significantly from γ by the factor
10: β “ 10γ (β ą γ) and β “ 10´1γ (β ă γ). For the
noise modeling w.r.t. the disturbed cost we consider uniformly
distributed random i.i.d. samples between [-0.01,0.01].
Performance Evaluation: Fig. 2 shows that our pricing
mechanism reduces the aggregated capacity violation even if
β ‰ γ since the ACV for each of the parameter choices
is significantly lower than ACV of purely anarchistic case
(red,dashed). However, we observe that a higher β may
accelerate this process. Additionally, we see that our pric-
ing method does not yield significant discrimination of the
agents, when compared to the improvement of the capacity
violation, as the differences between the aggregated delays
for the different cases are marginal at worst (see Fig. 2 (b)).
Still, we note a trade-off behavior in the choice of β: In
case that β is high (β ą γ), the capacity violation is the
lowest, but the experienced delay the highest. This occurrence
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Fig. 3. Pricing over time
reflects the increasing dominance of the price regulation over
the agents’ personal interest to decrease the incurred delay.
Another observation which we make is that if β “ γ, some
prices might at worst be constant for large times as predicted
in Corollary 2, indicating that even if the population fulfills
resource constraints, a control mechanism is necessary to
maintain this desired status quo.
Overly Strict Capacity Constraints: We also investigate
the performance of our method with stricter capacity con-
straints, i.e. Lr “ 11. We see that our method still yields
an improvement of the capacity violation compared to the
no pricing case (see Fig. 4). However, this comes with a
significant reduction of agents’ welfare in the form of a higher
AD (see Fig. 4 (a)). One may justify this as follows: Taking
a look at the pricing evolution (Fig. 3 (b)) of exemplary
resources, we observe a linear increase in prices dominating
the personal preferences (ˆ`piqPi in (1)) of the agents in large
times. Consequently, each of the affected agents decides for
routes that have the lower prices rather than those that incur
the lowest delay.
The enormous increase of prices shown in Fig. 3 (b) gives a
hint that the minimizer of the Rosenthal potential correspond-
ing to the network routing game over Q does not exist (c.f. the
Proof of Theorem (1)) due to overly strict resource constraints.
However, one may able to show the sub-linearity of ACV to
be of order Opn1{4q. Moreover, the increase in prices is in
contrast to the case where the capacity constraints are rather
loose (Fig. 3 (a)). The latter observations give the following
heuristic: In case that one observes a linear increase of some
prices, one may set a looser constraint so that the reduction
of the capacity violations does not come with a significant
reduction of the populations’ welfare.
VI. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE WORK
Assuming that the agents are choosing their action based
on the average historical cost of the resource bundles and
the logit choice rule, we introduced a resource-centric pricing
mechanism which allows a non-asymptotic guarantee of the
sub-linear growth of the expected aggregated violation of the
resource constraints of order Op?nq. In case that the resource
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Fig. 4. Performance for Lr “ 11
constraints are not overly strict, we observe numerically that
the resource sustainability delivered by our method, does not
come with significant discrimination of the agents. For the
general case, trade-off effect between resource sustainability
and population’s welfare might occur. In the future, we plan
to explain these aspects formally.
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APPENDIX
A. Additional Notations
‚ ĂMpiq “ miMpiq
‚ One can express φpµq more compactly by φpµq “ ĂMµ,
where ĂM “ rĂMp1q| ¨ ¨ ¨ |ĂMpNqs
B. Auxiliary Statements
Lemma 3: Suppose that Λ0 “ 0. For all r P rRs and k P N:
ACVpkq ď }Λpkq}2 ` α
řk´1
τ“1 }Λpτq}2
β
(10)
1) Proof of Lemma 3: The definition of our price policy
gives:
Λrpτ ` 1q ě Λrpτq ` βΓrpτq ´ αΛrpτq.
So by summing this inequality and subsequent telescoping, we
have since Λ0 “ 0:
k´1ÿ
τ“0
Γrpτq ď Λrpkq `
řk´1
τ“1 αΛrpτq
β
.
We observe that the inequality also holds when applying r¨s`
to the L.H.S. due to the R.H.S. of the inequality being non-
negative and since r¨s` is monotonically increasing. Moreover,
since the resulting inequality holds for all r P rRs and both
sides of the equation are positive it follows using monotonic-
ity: ›››››
«
k´1ÿ
τ“0
Γpτq
ff
`
›››››
2
ď
›››››Λpkq `
řk´1
τ“1 αΛpτq
β
›››››
2
We notice, that the L.H.S. corresponds to our definition of the
aggregated capacity violation at stage k ´ 1. Therefore ap-
plying the triangle inequality yields the upper-bound (10) and
(subsequently an approximation) for the aggregated capacity
violation purely based on the price.
C. Monotonicity of the KKT-operators
An operator F : RD Ñ RD is said to be monotone on
Z Ď RD if xx1´x2, F px1q´F px2qy ď 0, for all x1, x2 P Z .
If in the latter strict inequality hold for x1 ‰ x2, then F is said
to be strictly monotone. F is said to be c-strongly monotone
on Z if xx1 ´ x2, F px1q ´ F px2qy ď ´c}x1 ´ x2}2, for all
x1, x2 P Z .
Proposition 4: Let be X Ă RD. Consider the operator v˜ :
X ˆ RMě0 Ñ RD ˆ RM given by:
px, λq ÞÑ “vpxq `ATλ, b´Ax‰T , (11)
where v : X Ñ RD, A P RMˆD, and b P RM . It holds:
xα1 ´ α2, v˜pα1q ´ v˜pα2qy “ xx1 ´ x2, vpx1q ´ vpx2qy, (12)
for all αi :“ pxi, λiq P X ˆ RMě0, i “ 1, 2.
Proof: Straightforward computations yields:
xα1 ´ α2, v˜pα1q ´ v˜pα2qy “ xx1 ´ x2, vpx1q ´ vpx2qy
` xx1 ´ x2, ATλ1 ´ATλ2y ´ xλ1 ´ λ2, Ax1 ´Ax2y.
Moreover, we have:
xλ1 ´ λ2, Ax1 ´Ax2y “ xATλ1 ´ATλ2, x1 ´ x2y,
Combining both computations, we obtain (12).
D. Proof of the main result
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1): The logit choice Φpiq given in
(2) is a mirror map (Definition 3.1 in [25]) induced by the
negative Gibbs entropy ψipµpiqq “ řPiPPi µpiqPi lnpµpiqPi q as
regularizer on the simplex which is a compact convex subset.
Let be Fmpµ, Y pkqq :“ řNi“1miFipµpiq, Y piqpkqq where Fi
is the Fenchel coupling (Definition 4.2 in [25]) induced by
the negative Gibbs entropy as 1-strongly (w.r.t. } ¨ }8) convex
regularizer on the simplex ∆i.
By means of Fm, we can estimate the evolution of Al-
gorithm 1 with the dynamic pricing mechanism given in
Algorithm 2 by means of Lyapunov’s type argumentation.
Toward this end, we use the usual bound for the one step
difference of the Fenchel coupling (see e.g. Proposition 4.3 (c)
in [25]), insert the given iterate at time k ` 1 in the resulted
inequality, and apply triangle inequality, to obtain:
Fmpµ, Y pk ` 1qq ´ Fmpµ, Y pkqq
ď ´γ
Nÿ
i“1
mixµpiqpkq ´ µpiq, ˆ`piqpkq ` pipiqpkqyloooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooon
“:(a)
` γ
2
2
Nÿ
i“1
mi}ˆ`piqpkq ` pipiqpkq}28looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
“:(b)
.
(13)
By the triangle inequality and the definition of the constants
given in Section IV, we can estimate the summand (b) as
follows:
(b){2 ď C21}Λpkq}22 ` 2pC22 `
Nÿ
i“1
mi}ξpiqk`1}28q (14)
Now to estimate the summand (a), notice that we can write:
Nÿ
i“1
mixµpiqpkq´µpiq, pipiqpkqy “ xµpkq´µ,ĂMTΛpkqy. (15)
Combining all the previous observations, we have by sum-
ming the resulting inequality over all k “ 0, . . . , n´1, and by
subsequent telescoping, we obtain an upper bound for the cu-
mulative difference Vp1qn pµq :“ Fmpµ, Y pnqq´Fmpµ, Y p0qq:
Vp1qn pµq ď ´ γ
n´1ÿ
k“0
Nÿ
i“1
mixµpiqpkq ´ µpiq, `piqpµpkqqylooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
“xµpiqpkq´µpiq,∇
µpiqpkqV pµpkqqyloooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
xµpkq´µ,vpµpkqqy
´ γ
n´1ÿ
k“0
xµpkq ´ µ,ĂMTΛpkqy
` γ2C21
n´1ÿ
k“0
}Λpkq}22 ` γSn ` 2γ2Rn ` 2C22γ2n
(16)
where:
Sn :“ ´
n´1ÿ
k“0
xXpkq´x˚, ξpk`1qy, Rn :“ m˚N
nÿ
k“1
}ξpkq}28,
and where vpµq :“ ∇V pµq, where V denotes the Rosenthal
potential:
V : ∆ Ñ R, µ ÞÑ
ÿ
rPR
ż φrpµq
0
`rpuqdu, (17)
We now estimate the evolution of the price vector by pro-
viding a bound for Vp2qn pλq :“ p}Λpnq´λ}22´}Λp0q´λ}22q{2,
where λ ě 0. By similar computations as before, and by the
elementary bound 2xλ ´ Λpkq,Λpkqy ď }λ}22 ´ }Λpkq}22, we
obtain:
Vp2qn pλq ď β
n´1ÿ
k“0
xΛpkq ´ λ, φpµpkqq ´ Ly
` α2
n´1ÿ
k“0
p}λ}22 ´ }Λpkq}22q `
n´1ÿ
k“0
pβ2C23 ` α2}Λpkq}22q.
(18)
Combining the bounds (16) and (18), , it holds:
Vp1qn pµq ` Vp2qn pλq
ď ´γ
n´1ÿ
k“0
xzpkq ´ z, v˜pzpkqqy
` pβ ´ γq
n´1ÿ
k“0
xΛpkq ´ λ,ĂMµpkq ´ Ly
` pγ2C21 ´ α2 ` α
2q
n´1ÿ
k“0
}Λpkq}22
`
ˆ
2C22γ
2 ` C23β2 ` α}λ}
2
2
2
˙
n` γSn ` 2γ2Rn,
where:
zpkq :“ pµpkq,Λpkqq, z “ pµ, λq,
v˜pzpkqq “ r∇V pµpkqq `ĂMTΛpkq, L´ĂMµpkqs.
setting β “ γ and α “ δγ2 with δ P p0, 1{γ2q fulfilling (4),
we have:
Vp1qn pµq ` Vp2qn pλq
ď ´γ
n´1ÿ
k“0
xzpkq ´ z, v˜pzpkqqyloooooooooomoooooooooon
“:Υkpz,zpkqq
`
ˆ
p2C22 ` C23 qγ2 ` α}λ}
2
2
2
˙
n` γSn ` 2γ2Rn.
(19)
Notice that v is monotone (for the definition of monotone
operator see C) since V is convex. Thus by Proposition 4, we
have that v˜ is also monotone implying:
Υkpz, zpkqq ě xzpkq ´ z, v˜pzqy.
Moreover, by the slater’s condition and KKT argumen-
tations, we can find a Lagrangian dual optimizer λ˚ P
RRě0 corresponding to the minimizer µ˚ of V over Q :“
tµ P ∆ : Γpµq ď 0u. It follows that pµ˚, λ˚q P SOLpX ˆ
RR, v˜q, and consequently:
Υkpz˚, zpkqq ě xzpkq´z˚, v˜pz˚qy ě 0, z˚ “ pµ˚, λ˚q. (20)
Setting this observation into (19), we obtain:
Vp1qn pµ˚q ` Vp2qn pλ˚q
ď
ˆ
p2C22 ` C23 qγ2 ` α}λ˚}
2
2
2
˙
n` γSn ` 2γ2Rn.
(21)
Now, since Y0 “ 0, we have:
Vp1qn pµ˚q ě ´
Nÿ
i“1
mi
ˆ
max
∆i
ψi ´min
∆i
ψi
˙
ě ´m˚
Nÿ
i“1
lnp|Pi|q,
and thus Vp1qn pµ˚q ě ´∆ψ2{2. Combining this observation
with (21) and using Λ0 “ 0, we obtain that:
}Λpnq´λ˚}22
2
ď ∆ψ22 ` }Λp0q´λ˚}
2
2
2looooomooooon
}λ˚}22
2
`
ˆ
p2C22 ` C23 qγ2 ` α}λ˚}
2
2
2
˙
n
` γSn ` 2γ2Rn
“ ∆ψ22 ` p1` αnq }λ˚}
2
2
2 ` p2C22 ` C23 qγ2n
` γSn ` 2γ2Rn
(22)
Since Sn is a martingale with ErS1s “ 0, we have by taking
the expectation (and noticing ErSns “ 0), the desired result.
E. Proof of consequences of the main result
Proof (Proof of Corollary 2): Jensen’s and triangle inequal-
ity asserts that:b
E r}Λpnq ´ λ˚}22s ě E r}Λpnq ´ λ˚}2s ě E r}Λpnq}2s´}λ˚}2
Applying this to (5) and by the persistence of the noise, we
obtain (8).
For any k P rns, we have by Corollary 2:
E r}Λpkq}2s ď∆ψ ` p1`
ap1` δγ2nqq}λ˚}2
` pC˜1 ` σqγ?n.
Now, setting our choices of parameters into (8), it yields:
E r}Λpkq}2s ď∆ψ ` p1`
ap1` δc2qq}λ˚}2
` pC˜1 ` σqc “ A.
Consequently:
α
βE
«
n´1ÿ
k“0
}Λpkq}2
ff
“ δc?
n
n´1ÿ
k“1
E r}Λpkq}2s
ď δcpn´1q?
n
A ď δcA?n.
(23)
Moreover, we have E r}Λpnq}2s {β ď A?n{c. Setting this ob-
servation and (23) into (10), we have the remaining statement.
